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Cumulative Remedies in Bailment
Leases
The growth of "installment houses" and the popularity
of doing business on the "time-payment plan" have made
the contract under which such transactions are generally
consummated a constant subject of litigation in our courts.
Drawn as it is to protect the owner to the fullest extent,
constant efforts have been made to curb the effect of the
more stringent provisions.
The usual contract in Pennsylvania is the so-called
"bailment lease", an instrument designed to create the
relationship of bailor and bailee and providing for periodical "rental" payments. Title will not pass until all of the
rentals have been paid and an option to purchase for a
nominal consideration is exercised. The validity of the
transaction, the relationship, and the general terms of the
contract are now unquestioned, and it has definitely been
decided that the instrument is not within the Conditional
Sales Act of 1925, P. L. 603.'
In preserving the rights of the bailor there has always
been an attempt made to provide for cumulative remedies
upon default. The remedies of the bailor are (1) to repossess the bailed property; and (2) to collect the rentals contracted for. Provisions are always included to accelerate
the rentals not yet due when default occurs and to authorize
summary judgment as a guarantee of performance. But,
although the bailor may have both of these remedies secured to him in the instrument, his right to pursue both of
them to their full extent has often been denied.
'Stern & Co. v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 112 (1929).
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The author has attempted to exhibit this problem,
outline the cases decided upon it, and to reach a solution
both legally and logically sustainable and economically
sound.
THE GENERAL RULE
Innumerable cases in this jurisdiction can be cited for
the general proposition that a bailor who repossesses the
bailed article as provided in his "lease" cannot thereafter
proceed in any manner for the collection of the unpaid
rentals. Reclamation is a disaffirmance or rescission of
the lease agreement and terminates the bailment. The
term having come to an end, future rent cannot be col2
lected. The rule is well stated in Ketcham v. Davis:"The established rule of law governing the enforcement of such contracts is that the so-called lessor, on default, can adopt either remedy, but they are
not to be deemed cumulative ...

When the bailor has

elected his remedy, he is bound by that election."
The logic and precedents for this statement can hardly
be questioned. Its true meaning, however, must be fathomed. When the bailor chooses to disaffirm and rescind the
bailment the relationship ends; therefore the rent must
also cease. So also when the bailor affirms the lease and
is paid the balance due, he no doubt may not thereafter
disaffirm and reclaim the property. And this is true even
though the rentals must be collected by legal process. 8
However the rule on these facts may be applied, let it
be noted at once that it becomes fallacious to extend this
same rule to cases involving other facts. In every case
decided by our appellate courts this rule is qualified and
enunciated to be effective "unless it was plainly expressed in
the contract or a necessary implication from its terms" that the
remedies be cumulative. 4
Pa. Super. Ct. 583, 585 (1906).
Wright & Co. v. Bier, 3 Wash. 170.
4Campbell Co. v. Hickok, 140 Pa. 290 (1891); Scott v. Hough, 151
Pa. 630 (1892); Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165 Pa. 150 (1895); Jacob v.
231
3
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What is a necessary implication from the terms of the
contract has not been decided. No case has granted cumulative remedies "by implication." It is definitely decided
that to provide for reclamation "and" acceleration does
not give both of these rights:.. *. The fact that both remedies are mentioned,
and connected by the copulative "and" instead of the
disjunctive "or" is not conclusive of the question of his
(bailor's) right to pursue both."5
What then is the state of the law where the agreement
expressly provided for both remedies? Modern leases contain provision for cumulative remedies which cannot be
questioned as to meaning. But the general impression is
that they are invalid despite the general rule of law that:
"The rights of the parties (are) fixed by the agreement
which was the law to them."
The proper solution of this problem is clouded by the
loose language of the decision in Durr v. Replogle,7 where
the court states that:"While the agreement is in the alternative, so that
the so-called bailor may enter up judgement or reclaim
the property, there is nothing to prevent him doing
both. The two remedies given by the agreement are
not inconsistent with each other and the partial pursuit of one does not, therefore, preclude resort to the
other. The usual rule must prevail, that a party can
have any number of different remedies so long as. he procures but one satisfaction."
The most assiduous fault-finder could discover no error
in this language and so far does this case go on its merits.
But the learned Judge in this matter was prone to philosoGroff, 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 144 (1902); Durr v. Replogle, 167 Pa. 347
(1895); Kelly v. Schlinume, 220 Pa. 415 (1908).
"Ketchavi v. Davis, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 583, 585 (1906).

6Carnpbell v. Hickok, 140 Pa. 290 (1891); Walsh v. B. L. P. Motor
Co., Inc., 71 Pa. Super. Ct. 319 (1919).
7167 Pa. 347 (1895).
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phize in some dicta that cannot be satisfactorily explained
by any logician. He says:
"Having retaken the goods into his own possession, no doubt (the bailor) could not now collect the
judgment, and if he undertook to enforce it, this court
would very quickly interfere."
If this exceptional statement of the law be true, where
lies the logic of the rule that the bailor is entitled to one
(if only one) satisfaction? It is foolhardy to believe that
our courts will judicially note the fact (untrue as it necessarily is) that repossession of a used leased article is a satisfaction to the bailor. A statement of this conclusion of
itself proves its absurdity. In discussing then the Durr
case let it suffice to say that nothing in the facts before
the court merited the last statement though many will rise
to defend it on the ground that the lease involved did not
specifically give the bailor cumulative remedies to satisfaction. In the most recent work on Bailments the author attempts to explain away this statement by the adoption of
an excerpt from Ratchford v. Cayuga Cold Storage Co." The
explanation is entirely faulty, the cited case being far from
the author's point, and the Durr case incapable of affirmation from the viewpoint of the more recent decisions.'
EXPRESS PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT
It can be truly said that there is no case in the reports
.of the decisions of our appellate courts in which the rights
of the bailor were definitely cumulative and in which the
court refused to allow the pursuance of both remedies to
satisfaction."
Campbell v. Hickok," contained a specific provision for
rescission on repossession of the leased machinery.
Scott v. Hough, 2 does not involve a bailment lease
$217 N. Y. 569.
OScott on Bailments, page 121.
2OKelly v. Schlimme, 220 Pa. 413 (1908).
11140 Pa. 290 (1891).
12151

Pa. 630 (1892).
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at all but is based on principles peculiar to the law of mortgages.
Seanor v. McLaughlin,"' contained an agreement clearly
negativing the cumulative remedy theory.
In re Fitzpatrick," is to the same effect.
Wheeling v. Phillips,5 clearly is based upon the theory

that the remedies of the lessor were alternative and the
lease involved was one of real estate.
Jacob v. Groff," did not present a new question; it
conceived a bailment in which no provision for cumulative
remedies appeared.
Wilson v. Weaver,7 was another case in which the bailor had only the option to proceed.
Richards," clearly states that
Star Drilling Mach. Co. i,.
the bailor had to choose between two inconsistent remedies
which were not made cumulative.
Similarly most of our lower court decisions are based
upon leases having no provision for cumulative remedies. 1"
The case of Shaylor v. Parsons,20 appears first to have
recognized the right of the bailor to recover rentals due
even after repossession of the bailed article. The case is
peculiar because decided under a satisfaction statute and
not directly on the question but the tendency of the law
can be clearly ascertained behind the decision of the court.
Smith v. Case Machine Co., 21 is another case which involves the general rule rather by implication than by de18165 Pa. 150 (1895).

11 Fed. (2d) 445 (Pa 1923).

1510 Pa. Super. Ct. 634 (1899).

IL19 Pa. Super. Ct. 144 (1902).
2766 Pa. Super. Ct. 599 (1917).
18272 Pa. 383 (1922).
'0 See Republic Mtge. Co. v. Simons, 69 Pitts. L. J. 595; Ottenheimer v. National C. R. Co., 3 Som. 133; Coraopolis Nat. Bank v.
Gross Co., 56 Pitts. 121; In re Kirkwood's Asgt., 2 Pearson 257; White
Co. v. Cerutti, 16 Westm. 196; Frick Co. v. Nickler, 23 D~ist. 44; Wright
Co. v. Bier, 3 Wash. 170; Jacobs Bros. v. Walsh, 43 C. C. 602; Case
Threshing v. Evans, 17 Dist. 817; and Geiser Mig. Co. v. Crissinger,
17 C. C. 46.
201 Pa. Super. Ct. 281 (1896).
2-50 Pa. Super. Ct. 92 (1912).
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cision, Here the lease specifically provided that on default the bailor could retake the article and collect the rent
therefor to the date of repossession. Recaption took place
when there was no default so that our question is not passed upon. The court held that this did not give the bailor
-the right to collect the rent to date and then repossess, but
the right to exercise the cumulative remedies given by
the agreement is unquestioned.
THE CASE ON POINT IN PENNSYLVANIA
Walsh v. B. L. P. Motor Co.,Inc., 22 is on point. In this
case defendant leased an automobile to the plaintiff for a
certain rental. Plaintiff "traded in" an old car which defendant agreed to return if there was a default and the
leased car was repossessed. Plaintiff defaulted. Defendant obtained judgment under the stipulation for accelerated rent, then replevied the leased vehicle, and then refused
to return the "trade in" and defendant set off in counterclaim its judgment on the lease. The Court held:
"(1) The right to set-off a judgment is undoubted. Knoller v. Everett Realty Co., 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 169,
176."
"(2) The remedies (of defendant) are plainly cumulative, and the plaintiff is estopped by his agreement
from questioning defendant's right to exercise them."
In this case the lease read "lessor may at option, by
collection, suit, or otherwise, enforce payment of said notes
(rental installments) and no suits or legal proceedings
with respect thereto shall, however, be deemed any waiver
of said right of lessor to take possession on default or
breach as aforesaid."
Most up-to-date agreements are much stronger and
far more definite as to the remedies of the lessor and that
it is the express provision of the agreement that his remedies be cumulative is so clearly expressed that it cannot admit of argument.
2271

Pa. Super. Ct. 319 (1919).
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It is to be noted that our lower courts have recognized
the right to cumulative remedies where expressly provided
for.

23

THE RULE IN THE LAMSON CASES
Probably the most interesting line of decisions on the
question involved concerns the so-called "Lamson Lease"
used by the Lamson Company in the installation of "cash
and parcel carrier" systems in mercantile establishments.
The earliest form of this lease provided for an acceleration
of rental upon default or determination of tenancy of the
bailee, and in a separate clause that the lessor might repossess without terminating the lease. This provision was
first adjudicated in Lawson etc. v. Bowland, 24 where bankruptcy of the bailee took place. The bailor repossessed
and its claim for accelerated rentals was not allowed on
the ground that the lease only provided for "default" or
"termination", not including bankruptcy; the court holding, it is true, that every possible doubt should be resolved
against a construction giving the cumulative remedy to
the bailor.
The Lamson Company then altered its lease to include "bankruptcy or breach of the lease" and provided
for cumulative remedy "after such a breach." This slight
ambiguity of language gave the courts a nail on which
to hang a decision disallowing the claim for accelerated
rent. In re Quaker Drug Co.25 But the anomalous case of
In re Merwin & Co.,28 was then decided, not citing the
Quaker case. There although a breach occurred before the
bankruptcy the court held the provision invalid as providing
a penalty and since no testimony showed the property to
be of less value to the bailor when repossessed than when
leased, no damage was shown which could liquidate the
23

White Co. v. Anthracite Iron & Steel Co., 30 Lack. 113 (1929);
Brosius v. Nield, 10 Del. 65 (1906); Dunham Inc. v. Pursel, 12 D. &
C. 425.
24114 Fed. 639 (1902).
25
1n re Quaker Drug Co., 204 Fed. 689 (1912).
26206 Fed. 116 (1913).
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real penal sum due.2 7 To the same effect is In re Miller Bros.,
219 Fed. 851 (1915).
But we find the rule being relaxed in In re CaswellMassey Co.2 1 in which the court held that if the value of the
leased system was less on repossession than the total rental
less rentals paid, the contract could validly stipulate for
acceleration and the cumulative remedies.
In 1928 the question was placed squarely before the U.
S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Lamson Company v. Elliott,
etc.,' wherein the new Lamson lease containing a provision
that the accelerative clause was a right "in addition to"
the right of repossession, is construed. The district court
confirmed a master's report rejecting the claim for rentals.
This the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Miller Bros.
case is differentiated because of the change in the lease.
The otherwise consequent loss to the bailor is considered
and the court realized that "it may work hardship to the
user and excess profit to the owner in some cases, but
that does not make it so generally arbitrary and in the
nature of a mere forfeiture as to destroy its validity." The
court, however, goes furt'rer than its decision in discussing the problem and, deah \g with it from an economic
standpoint similar to that uv in which we hereafter touch,
suggests that were the bailor -Lo realize an unjust profit by
retaking and resale or reletting, \the bailee might
make out a case for equitable protection, or an aspect
of forfeiture would then arise, even at law; but here
in the claim filed the owner had given full credit for
everything which it had been able to resell in this way."
This decision clearly considered and logically decided
may well be considered the exact state of the law and an
exact statement of the equities herein considered.
Admittedly the decisions of courts other than our own
are only persuasive precedent for the latter. Their authority may be said to rest only upon principles of comity.
2?tTo the same effect is In re Miller Bros., 219

8208 Fed. 571 (1913).
2925 Fed. (2d) 4 (1928).

Fed. 851 (1915).
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When equitable principles would seem to require a different
rule these decisions will be disregarded. It must therefore
be pointed out that the rule laid down is not only precedent but is equitable; and in so treating the subject we note
three important phases; (1) the economic principles involved, (2) the rule of conditional sales, and (3) the lease
of realty analogy.
THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
To hastily differentiate and pass over a decision such
as that of Durr v. Replogle"° is a simple method of solving a
difficult problem. But the question of "What is a satisfaction to the bailor?" is so important and so basic as to require more thought and consideration. Practically, from
the lawyer's standpoint, the question has been discussed
and probably decided by the cases hereinbefore referred to.
But behind the reasons for these decisions lies the theory
upon which they are based.
That principles of equity applied in our courts of law
will not permit the bailor to obtain more than he bargained
for, is a foregone conclusion. He is "entitled to but one
satisfaction" and no wording of his lease will allow him
more. But is he not entitled to that one satisfaction? Our
decisions say that he is. A practical view of the transaction
lends to a better understanding of the logic behind our law.
The lease contemplates a rental for a period of time.
The leased article is perishable, its span of useful existence
is limited. An economic survey tells us that the rentals
must not stretch over a greater period than the life of the
leased article. 31 A horse, an automobile, a piece of furniture,
is worth X dollars. But what is its fair rental price? If rented for the entire period of its usefulness, it must appear
that the total rentals must also be X dollars; that is to say,
if all rentals are paid regularly to the bailor, the bailed
article should last through ordinary wear and tear for the
period of its rental. But another principle must be borne in
80167 Pa. 347 (1895).

"'See Kelley v. Schlinime, 220 Pa. 413.
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mind; an article whose probability of usefulness is one year
and whose rental is therefore one-twelfth of X dollars per
month, is not worth eleven-twelfths of X dollars at the end
of the first month. Experience shows that it is worth only
two-thirds, one-half or even one-tenth of X dollars after
the first month, for it has then become "second hand." Its
"initial depreciation",as it is called, will of course depend on
the type of article; for instance, clothing and the like may
have a' recognizable depreciation of 80% where steel instruments of non-varying types may depreciate only 10%.
This fact of "initial depreciation" therefore must in 99 cases
out of every 100 so alter the value of an article as to render
its repossession far less than satisfaction to the bailor.
Specifically :-an automobile is leased for $1,000 for 10
months. After two months it is repossessed. Its value less
depreciation of course, can only be ascertained by sale or
by another lease. It brings only $500 when it goes under
the hammer at public sale. The bailee has paid only $200
and the bailor stands to lose $300 on the transaction, not
through any fault of his own but through the default of
the purchaser.
Practically, of course, the solution to this problem is
to require a "down payment" in renting merchandise large
enough to cover the initial depreciation. But in the light
of the law thrown upon the facts in these cases can it in
any justice be said that repossession effects a statisfaction?
It may. This must be determined by the appraisal of the
value of the article at the time of repossession-and this
can only be done by a re-sale or re-lease of the article
repossessed. If it brings sufficient to liquidate the balance
of the indebtedness there is reason to argue that in
equity the bailor has had satisfaction and his further remedies are cut off; this is the suggestion of the Lamson case.
But to urge that satisfaction of a $800 debt has been obtained by repossession of a vehicle worth only $500 on resale is absurd in both law and fact. It is certainly then within the power of the contracting parties to stipulate that
the bailor shall have "satisfaction" of the indebtedness.
This would then require him to ascertain the value of the
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repossessed article by resale. If the resale is made at public
auction after due notice there can be no question that the
price brought must in law represent the value of the article
at the time of repossession.
Having deducted this ascertained amount from the balance due on the account, there remains a further sum due
the bailor before it can be said that he has received "satisfaction". As to this he should certainly have the right to
proceed on his judgment or to set-off against any claim of
the bailee arising from the contract of bailment.
This view of the law has evidently found substantiation
in the better considered cases where the question was directly before the court, as we have pointed out.
THE RULE OF CONDITIONAL SALES
Attention must be called to the line of well-considered
cases involving contracts of conditional sale in which it is
stipulated that repossession shall not bar action for the
deficit should one appear upon resale of the repossessed
article. Every jurisdiction passing upon these facts has
upheld the terms of the contract. 2
It will be noted that the express provisions of the Conditional Sales Act of 1925, P. L. 603, provide for the recovery of a deficiency after resale by the repossessing seller
and therefore legislatively set forth the precise measure of
damage outlined in this discussion.
THE LEASE OF REALTY ANALOGY
Striking similarities exist between the type of bailment
we are discussing and the lease of real estate for a term of
years. Story's definition of a bailment is:
"Delivery of a thing in trust for some specific object
or purpose, and upon a contract, express or implied,
32

See the cases collected in 37 A. L. R. 91, 94; In re Bettman v.
Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (1918); Keller v. Goodman, 296 Fed. 909
(1924).
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to conform to the object or purpose of the trust."33
The more confining definition by Kent is:
"A delivery of goods in trust upon a contract, express
or implied, that the trust shall be duly executed and the
goods restored to the bailee as soon as the purpose of
4
the bailment shall be answered."'
Substitute as the subject matter of the transaction a
parcel of real estate or the improvements thereon and the
incidents of a lease are apparent. Of course the practical
reason for any difference in treatment of the subject is
two-fold: (1) the history of their development, the bailment coming to us from the Roman Law and the lease
from the Common Law of England, and (2) the intrinsic
difference arising from the perishable character of the
bailed article in contrast with the indestructibility of real
estate.
The similarity of these relationships is generally considered sufficient reason for drawing analogies between
them. But in turn their dissimilarities have led our courts
to limit those analogies to only those situations which tend
toward a practical solution of bailment problems. So where
a lessor after default in the rent retakes possession, it is
the general rule of law that the lease is terminated and no
rental thereafter can be collected from the tenant. An accelerated rental is denied because the term has ceased to
exist; "the continuing possession is the consideration for
the continuing rent." And therefore should the lessor on
retaking possession dispose of the real estate, his claim for
rentals must cease.
Two essential differences exist between the lease of
realty and the bailment under discussion. They must be
deemed sufficient in law to differentiate the resultant rights
of the parties although when considering the equities of a
given situation, as will hereinafter be pointed out, the same
equitable principles may be applied.
(1) "It is not characteristic of a real estate lease that
$sKrause v. Commonwealth, 93 Pa. 418,
BASiter v. Morris, 13 Pa. 218.
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the lessor at the making distinctly parts with a consideration separate from possession and which is to be repaid to him only gradually by rent installments spread
over the whole period.""5
When the term ends the leased property is returned to
the lessor, its condition generally being unchanged, its
value unimpaired and the possibilities of its re-rental or sale
unaffected. During the term there is left in the lessor a
valuable right of property separate and distinct from the
right to collect rentals, capable of sale; a reversionary interest of material value, generally far in excess of the value
of the lease. The bailor, on the other hand, technically retains a title in the bailed article which, as we have pointed
out, from the very nature of things must be valueless and
useless at the end of the term, not capable of sale or further
bailment or, if it should be, then of such greatly depreciated
value as to be trifling compared to that of the original
article bailed. This loss must then be sustained by the
bailor upon repossession and termination of the lease before
the end of the term. And "it is certain that a provision for
precipitating future payments, even after reclamation, is
necessary for the protection of the owner."
(2) "In another respect the anology to a lease of real
estate fails. The lessor has a single piece of real estate.
He cannot multiply it. With reference to a manufactured article, he may make as many as he can find
customers for. If on retaking an article .once placed
he sells it to another, (presuming he can sell it) he
thereby destroys his outlet for a new sale with full
profit."3
The equitable phases of the comparison are even
more favorable to the lessor. It has generally been considered the practical rule of law that "when competent
parties, dealing as strangers, have provided for stated
damages on default, and the damages are made proportion35Lamson

86

Co. v. Elliott etc., 25 Fed. (2d) 4, 58 A. L. R. 295.

Lamson Co. v. Elliott etc., 25 Fed. (2d) 4.
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ate to the extent of the default, and probably approximate
the actual damage, no reason is seen for defeating that
contract." That said provisions for liquidated damages are
held valid and equitable in our jurisdiction needs no citation of authority, and that the approximation of the damage
in the manner provided for in the up-to-date bailment
contract is entirely equitable and mutually considerate to
the parties is evident from the practical results worked by
the lessor's proceeding in strict accordance with his agreement.
We have, in effect, noted the equitable rule of minimazation of damages applied by our courts in cases of real
estate. Where the tenant quits possession and becomes
thereby liable for the balance of the term, the law will not
permit the landlord to sit idly by and collect his rent as
it comes due. He must use reasonable efforts to re-let the
7
premises and so reduce the loss occasioned to the tenant.3
Similarly the bailee, upon return of the bailed article or
reclamation by the bailor, should be given the benefit of
reasonable efforts on the part of the latter to again dispose
of the property by bailment or sale. Once having done so
however, the equities of the situation require that the bailee
be chargeable for the difference between the rent due accelerated to the end of the term and the re-sale value of
the property so determined.
The following clause used in the up-to-date lease the
author considers to be sufficiently specific to guarantee
to the bailor.the cumulative rights to which he is entitled.
"It is agreed and understood by and between the
parties hereto that the Lessor's remedies herein provided or any remedies to which the Lessor may be entitled by law are cumulative rights and not alternative
and the Lessor may pursue any and all of them at the
same time or at different times for the same breach,
and that the repossession of the leased property as
provided in this lease, shall not bar an action for the
tHochman v. Kuebler, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 481 (1912); Auer v.
Penn, 99 Pa. 370 (1882).
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recovery of the rental provided for in this lease and
conversely an action for the recovery of the rentals as
provided herein shall not bar the lessor's right to the
repossession of the leased property as provided for
herein and any attempt to enforce any one of the said
remedies shall not be a bar to the subsequent pursuit
of any other; and no acquiescence by the Lessor in any
breach or breaches by the Lessee of any of the covenants herein contained and no failure by the Lessor to
exercise any of the remedies, to which it is entitled
shall operate as a waiver to its or their rights to pursue any or all of said remedies."
Philadelphia, Pa.

MILFORD J. MEYER.

